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Rainforest Chernobyl Revisited†
The Clash of Human Rights and BIT Investor Claims: Chevron’s Abusive
Litigation in Ecuador’s Amazon
by Steven Donziger,* Laura Garr & Aaron Marr Page**
A Marathon Environmental Litigation: Seventeen
Years and Counting

During the U.S. stage of the litigation, Chevron submitted
fourteen sworn affidavits attesting to the fairness and adequacy
of Ecuador’s courts. The company also drafted a letter that was
signed by Ecuador’s then ambassador to the United States, a
former Chevron lawyer, asking the U.S. court to send the case
to Ecuador.2 Representative of Chevron’s position was the sworn
statement from Dr. Ponce Martinez, its lead lawyer in Ecuador
for more than three decades: “In my opinion, based upon my
knowledge and expertise, the Ecuadorian courts provide a totally
adequate forum in which these plaintiffs fairly could pursue their
claims.”3 As a condition of the dismissal, Chevron promised
to subject itself to jurisdiction in Ecuador for purposes of the
claims, agreed to abide by any judgment from Ecuador’s courts
subject only to narrow enforcement defenses in the United
States, and waived statute of limitations defenses.4 Armed with
these legally-enforceable commitments, indigenous and farmer
communities from Ecuador’s Amazon region, along with their
U.S. and Ecuadorian lawyers, made the bold decision to re-file
the same tort action in Ecuador’s courts. The communities were
committed to seeking redress for human rights abuses that have
decimated indigenous groups and to addressing the broader,
related questions of accountability and impunity. Therefore,
they plowed ahead despite deep concern that Chevron, with its

By Lou Dematteis/Redux.

T

he last time the environmental lawsuit Aguinda v.
ChevronTexaco was discussed in these pages, the defendant Chevron Corporation1 had just won a forum non
conveniens dismissal of the case from a U.S. federal court to
Ecuador after nine years of litigation. Filed in 1993, the lawsuit
alleged that Chevron’s predecessor company, Texaco, while it
exclusively operated several oil fields in Ecuador’s Amazon
from 1964 to 1990, deliberately dumped billions of gallons of
toxic waste into the rainforest to cut costs and abandoned more
than 900 large unlined waste pits that leach toxins into soils
and groundwater. The suit contended that the contamination
poisoned an area the size of Rhode Island, created a cancer epidemic, and decimated indigenous groups.

Steven Donziger, attorney for the affected communities, speaks with
Huaorani women outside the Superior Court at the start of the Chevron
trial on October 21, 2003 in Lago Agrio in the Ecuadoran Amazon.

vast resources and cadres of loyal and influential operatives in
Ecuador built up over decades of operations there, would either
make the case disappear or draw it out endlessly. In 2004, it
looked as though the case could be an example of how “courts
have the potential to re-allocate some of the costs of globalization — in this case, environmental destruction — from the most
vulnerable rainforest dwellers to the most powerful energy companies on the planet.” Those words were written in this publication by one of the authors when assessing the case in 2004, at the
very beginning of the trial in Ecuador that has yet to conclude.5
The ensuing seven years of environmental litigation in
Ecuador have been far from easy, raising a number of critical
legal and policy challenges relating to accountability for human
rights violations. Most of these challenges stem from Chevron’s
use of what one observer called a “textbook example of abusive
litigation” to forestall resolution of pressing legal claims on
which the survival of thousands of people could depend.6 As
discussed below, Chevron representatives have repeatedly tried
to improperly influence the court and apply political pressure to
coax Ecuador’s government to quash the private lawsuit in violation of Ecuador’s constitution.7 Evidence suggests the company
is now violating its commitments to a U.S. federal court about its
intentions to abide by a judgment in Ecuador.8 Chevron recently
resorted to using a Nixon-style “dirty tricks” sting operation

*Steven Donziger serves as legal consultant to the plaintiffs in the
Aguinda v. ChevronTexaco case, and has been involved in the litigation since it began in 1993.
**Laura Garr and Aaron Marr Page are also legal consultants for the
Aguinda plaintiffs.
†Steven Donziger, Rainforest Chernobyl: Litigating Indigenous Rights and
The Environment in Latin America, 11 No. 2 Hum. Rts. Brief 1 (2004).
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In Ecuador, providing scientific proof has required the
communities to assemble and manage teams of environmental
experts to produce reports and counter-reports that collectively
run into the thousands of pages. The legal side has required just
as much effort, not only to determine questions of liability but
also to respond to hundreds of motions filed by Chevron to delay
the trial over the years. Chevron, having correctly concluded it
is far cheaper to litigate than to pay the cost of cleaning up an
area the size of Rhode Island, adopted a simple defense strategy:
deny, distract, and delay. The company can afford this strategy: it
made U.S. $25 billion in profit in 2008 alone. The communities
operate under a more terrifying calculus: more than 1,400 cancer
deaths due to oil contamination and near-constant exposure to
cancer-causing oil hydrocarbons, resulting in damages up to U.S.
$27.3 billion,10 according to a court-appointed Special Master.11

Courtesy of Steven Donziger.

designed to undermine the trial and fabricate evidence of judicial misconduct.9

The Shushufindi 38 well site.

The communities have been buoyed by the fundamental
strength of the underlying scientific and technical evidence.
Any visitor to the region can see the prima facie case in striking terms: old Texaco barrels mired in hundreds of giant,
unlined, open-air pits of oily sludge that leach their contents via
pipes built by the oil company into nearby streams and rivers.
Carcasses of cows and birds can often be seen floating in the
oil muck at well sites built, operated, and closed — but never
cleaned — by Texaco. Evidence demonstrates the company
never conducted a single environmental impact study or health
evaluation in the decades it operated in the Amazon, even though
thousands of people lived in and around its oil production facilities and relied on rivers and streams that the company used to
discharge toxic waste. Hundreds of waste pits left by Texaco
have been tested extensively by Chevron, the plaintiffs, and
various third parties, revealing levels of total petroleum hydrocarbons and heavy metals hundreds and sometimes thousands of
times higher than allowable norms in Ecuador and the U.S.12 In
fact, Chevron’s own documents prove that, as the communities
have long alleged, Texaco never re-injected or safely disposed
of “produced water,”13 and instead directed it via an elaborate
system of pipes into surrounding streams and rivers which local
residents still use for drinking and bathing.14

were never treated.16 Worse, two former Texaco lawyers, both
now employed by Chevron, are facing criminal fraud charges
in Ecuador for using a laboratory test that made it impossible to
detect anything more than trace amounts of toxins in the soils
at highly contaminated sites at the time the company secured
the release.17 The results of this test were reported to Ecuador’s
government to prove the remediation met the required clean-up
standards.
At trial, Chevron used soil samples lifted far from the contaminated areas as proof that its operation had no environmental
impact, but this tactic was documented by the Special Master.
Chevron’s technical team reported that it could not detect contamination at waste pits that resembled lakes of oil sludge, such
as one at a well site called Shushufindi 38. At this site, Chevron
reported a “no detect” based on a laboratory analysis of a random soil sample of dirt lifted from surrounding forest far away
from the waste pit. This sampling result and others like it were
used as the basis for a technical report submitted by Chevron
as evidence to the court that concluded the site posed no risk
to human health.18 Chevron also claims that the contamination
is really the fault of the current operator of the oil fields, stateowned Petroecuador. However, this has proven to be both factually false, according to company records and field samplings
that reveal contamination at sites never touched by Petroecuador,
and legally insufficient, because the concept of joint and several
liability applies to remediation cases precisely in order to prevent the general public from having to foot the bill to clean up
contamination that once benefited a polluter.

The communities have successfully rebutted Chevron’s
defenses as factually false and legally inadequate. For example,
after Aguinda was filed in 1993, Chevron decided, without consulting with the communities, to remediate a small portion of
the contaminated sites in exchange for a release from Ecuador’s
government. The release expressly excludes the private claims
in Aguinda; yet, as the case was pending in U.S. court, Chevron
argued that the release covered those claims and that the case
should be dismissed based on the purported clean-up.15 Though
the U.S. district court never accepted this argument, Chevron
still reaps huge public relations benefits and buys years of
time by litigating the “release” issue repeatedly in various fora
and using it to claim that the very existence of the lawsuit in
Ecuador is a violation of its contractual rights. Aside from the
fact the “release” is not applicable to the claims in Aguinda,
the clean-up on which it was conditioned appears to have been
a fraud: samples from both parties in the current trial reveal
that the “remediated” sites are just as contaminated as ones that

There have been myriad other obstacles related to Chevron’s
effort to use its political muscle to terminate the Aguinda case.
In the United States, the company employs six public relations
firms and roughly one dozen lobbyists to handle the Ecuador
issue, leading one Congressperson to accuse the company of
engaging “in a lobbying effort that looks like little more than
extortion.”19 The lobbyists, who include former high-level
Clinton and Bush administration officials, try to influence
the U.S. government to cancel bilateral trade preferences for
Ecuador as “punishment” for letting its citizens sue Chevron in
U.S. courts.20 If Chevron were to succeed, Ecuador’s economy
would lose approximately 300,000 jobs.21 Public relations firms,
9
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including Hill & Knowlton (of tobacco industry fame) and
Edelman Worldwide, try to quash unfavorable stories, sow doubt
about scientific evidence, and control the political environment
to influence judicial decisions and public opinion. Their work
includes buying advertisements in U.S. and Ecuadorian newspapers and on websites attacking the Ecuador trial judge, court
expert, and the plaintiffs’ representatives. The two Ecuadorian
men who are leading the lawsuit were labeled “environmental
con men” in a full-page Chevron advertisement in the San
Francisco Chronicle in 2008, the day before they received the
prestigious Goldman Environmental Award.22 Chevron also
makes significant donations to various U.S. non-profit organizations to provide a platform to press its views on Ecuador. This
includes providing financial support to the Fund for Peace to set
up roundtable discussions for Chevron lawyers to opine on how
the company is being victimized by Ecuador’s court system.23

major U.S. law firms, is largely an attempt by Chevron to create
a “record” that Ecuador’s judicial system is defective to help it
defeat enforcement of any judgment in the Aguinda case using
the same argument. In this “Seven Cases” arbitration, Ecuador
presented evidence that Chevron deliberately delayed each of
the cases — sometimes working no more than one person-hour
per year on each case. In 2001, to induce the U.S. federal court
to move the Aguinda case to Ecuador, Chevron cited the same
seven cases as evidence of the “fairness and competency” of
Ecuador’s judiciary. An Ecuadorian trial court recently granted
Chevron a $1.5 million judgment against Petroecuador in one
of these cases.30 A decision in the “Seven Cases” arbitration is
still pending.
Despite these roadblocks, the communities have kept the
Aguinda trial on track. In 2008, the aforementioned Special
Master, appointed by the court and accepted by Chevron without
objection as an expert in a previous part of the case, calculated
an overall damages figure of U.S. $27.3 billion, roughly equivalent to twenty percent of the company’s market value. The price
tag, while considerable, is consistent with the clean-up costs
for other large environmental disasters around the world.31
Ultimately a judge will decide questions of liability and damages. Even if the court finds Chevron liable and lowers the
damages award, something significant is happening in Ecuador:
some of the world’s most vulnerable indigenous groups and
rainforest communities are moving ever closer to having their
human rights claims resolved after years of struggle against one
of the world’s largest and most influential corporations. Despite
Chevron’s continued attempts at delay, the trial is nearing the
submission of closing arguments.

In Ecuador, Chevron has repeatedly tried to enlist the U.S.
embassy in Quito to advance its litigation interests and to
help it dispense with the lawsuit through a separate settlement
with Ecuador’s government. Chevron signed a contract with
Ecuador’s army — historically viewed by indigenous groups
as a hostile force — to provide it private security and housing
during the trial. At one point, the commander of the base on
which Chevron’s legal team maintained its office signed a false
military report, alleging a security threat to the Chevron lawyers
that delayed a critical court-supervised field inspection for six
months.24 Chevron has met on a regular basis with Ecuador’s
presidents during the pendency of the litigation to press its
position that the case should be dismissed.25 Finally, Amnesty
International and the International Commission of Jurists have
noted that attorneys for the Ecuadorian communities have been
victims of mysterious death threats and robberies.26 Notably,
Chevron has refused to join these organizations in condemning
these threats.

When it became clear that the evidence in the trial against
Chevron was building and that the company’s multi-pronged
strategy to extinguish the case was not working, a Chevron
spokesman announced bluntly to the Wall Street Journal: “We’re
not paying and we’re going to fight this for years if not decades
into the future.”32 The company put out a press release promising the plaintiffs a “lifetime of litigation” if they persisted.33
Chevron’s General Counsel said he expected to lose the case, but
vowed that Chevron would “fight until hell freezes over and then
skate it out on the ice.” These statements clearly contradicted
Chevron’s earlier promises to abide by a judgment in Ecuador’s
courts. It became increasingly clear to the plaintiffs that Chevron
intended to play by a different set of rules. It appeared Chevron
not only sought to quash the case, but also to kill off the very
idea that indigenous communities could empower themselves
to vindicate their legal rights. In a startling moment of candor,
a Chevron lobbyist interviewed about the lawsuit admitted to
Newsweek’s Michael Isikoff: “We can’t let little countries screw
around with big companies like this — companies that have
made big investments around the world.”34

On the legal front, Chevron quickly abdicated on its commitments to the U.S. federal court once the evidence pointed to
its culpability. In 2004, as the Aguinda trial was in full motion,
Chevron filed a claim against Ecuador’s government before the
American Arbitration Association (AAA) in New York, seeking
a declaration that it was not liable for further environmental
clean-up based on the release and ordering Ecuador’s executive branch to intervene in the case to immunize Chevron from
any liability.27 The same New York federal court that originally
dismissed Aguinda to Ecuador soundly rebuked Chevron and
permanently stayed the arbitration. The Second Circuit denied
Chevron’s appeal with a unanimous summary order, and the
Supreme Court denied review even after the company hired
former U.S. Solicitor Paul Clement to prepare its petition for
certiorari. 28
Separately, in 2004 Chevron filed an arbitration claim
against Ecuador under the U.S.-Ecuador Bilaterial Investment
Treaty (BIT),29 relating to seven lawsuits covering commercial disputes with Petroecuador that were filed in Ecuador
by Texaco as it was winding down its operations in the early
1990s. Chevron alleged it was a victim of “denial of justice” in
Ecuador because the cases had taken almost fifteen years and
no rulings had issued. The costly and lengthy arbitration over
these claims, which is now in its fourth year and involves several

International Arbitration as a “Star Wars”-Style
Defense against Human Rights Claims
With the mindset expressed by these Chevron officials,
it becomes understandable how a corporate defense strategy
can be pushed beyond standard legal and ethical boundaries.
From the communities’ perspective, this is exactly what happened. Recently, Chevron launched a maneuver that it believes
10
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Although clothed in the elegant language of
international jurisprudence, Chevron’s underlying
construct is ominous: a corporation with almost
limitless resources is using an investment treaty
as a weapon to engineer a favorable verdict in a
human rights trial in which it promised to
participate and satisfy any adverse judgment.
can render the seventeen-year Aguinda trial a pointless exercise. Relying on the 1997 BIT between the United States and
Ecuador, Chevron in September 2009 initiated a closed-door
arbitration against the Ecuadorian government claiming it has
not been treated fairly in the Ecuador trial.35 Chevron argues
that the release received from Ecuador for its “clean-up” in the
1990s should absolve it of all liability — even though the release
expressly excludes private claims of the type being asserted in
Aguinda and the remedial work on which it is based appears
to have been fraudulent. Chevron argues that the Ecuador trial
court, to whose jurisdiction it had agreed to submit when the
case was in U.S. federal court, erred in not summarily dismissing
the claims of the plaintiffs based on the release. Chevron already
had raised the same argument about the release in multiple public courts and failed to prevail: the U.S. court in the early years
of the case, the Ecuadorian court in the Aguinda trial where a
decision is pending, and the aforementioned litigation in U.S.
federal court over Chevron’s right to the AAA arbitration against
Ecuador that was permanently stayed. In this latter proceeding,
Chevron had hastily withdrawn the same claim regarding the
release after the U.S. federal judge said it was “highly unlikely”
it would prevail on the issue. 36

sands of people of their legal rights to seek a remedy against the
perpetrator of what they consider to be an environmental crime
on their ancestral lands. The arbitral panel would be governed by
the UNCITRAL rules, which were created under the auspices of
the United Nations to promote dispute resolution in the context
of international trade law.38
Although clothed in the elegant language of international
jurisprudence, Chevron’s underlying construct is ominous: a
corporation with almost limitless resources is using an investment treaty as a weapon to engineer a favorable verdict in a
human rights trial in which it promised to participate and satisfy
any adverse judgment. It is now trying to use international arbitration to accomplish what it could not through political pressure
or proceedings in open court. That this process will wreak havoc
on the rule of law in Ecuador, with negative consequences for
other foreign investors in the country, appears to make no difference to Chevron as long as it benefits the company in this
instance.39
A leading specialist in this area recently noted in a somewhat tinged compliment that Chevron’s claim is “what the state
of the art looks like” as far as corporations taking on states in
international arbitration.40 While extreme, Chevron’s maneuver
is the latest example of a profoundly disturbing trend that could
have devastating consequences for human rights victims seeking recourse against private actors in the courts of their home
countries. There are numerous recent examples of multinational
corporations using the international arbitration system along the
lines of the Reagan-era “Star Wars Missile Defense” fantasy — a
shield to deflect the claims of human rights victims being heard
in national courts around the globe. Under Chevron’s proposed
construct, the rulings of these private arbitration panels could be
tailored to trump the rulings of any public court, including the
highest courts of the countries where the abuses occurred.

In this latest arbitration notification, Chevron seeks to have
a panel of international jurists — all private citizens not part
of any public judicial body — issue an order instructing the
government of Ecuador to mandate that its constitutionally-independent courts determine that Chevron is “not liable” despite the
mountains of scientific and legal evidence in the Aguinda case
and despite the fact the Aguinda court has yet to rule. Chevron
is also trying to burrow its way into this forum even though
it agreed to the dismissal of the Aguinda action in the United
States with only one reservation to contest a judgment — an
enforcement action in the United States, where it could present
the same underlying facts of unfair treatment to try to nullify any
adverse judgment that it plans to present in the BIT arbitration.
If Chevron gets its way, the BIT arbitral panel would allow it to
re-litigate the core claims at issue in the public trial in Ecuador.
The communities, by arbitration rules, would not have access
to the proceedings, much less the opportunity to be a party.37
Chevron’s desired result would effectively strip tens of thou-

In the last two decades, multinational corporations have lined
up to sue states in ways that raise profound public policy, human
rights, and environmental concerns. Recently, when El Salvador
denied Canadian gold mining company Pacific Rim a mining
permit — after conducting an extensive environmental impact
assessment — the case wound up at international arbitration
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with El Salvador potentially on the hook for hundreds of millions of dollars.41 Investors have sued Argentina, Bolivia, and
Tanzania on claims that raise profound issues with respect to the
fundamental human right to water;42 insurance companies have
attacked developing-country plans to institute universal health
care;43 and a white-owned mining company sued South Africa
alleging that the country’s internationally-celebrated affirmative action program discriminates against the company.44 For
smaller or economically disadvantaged countries, these are not
minor matters: for example, the U.S. $353 million award won by
American investor Ronald Lauder against the Czech Republic
for alleged “interference” with his Czech TV business equaled
the entire national health insurance budget of the country.45

of circumstances. Creative lawyering has dragged many states
into arbitration they never would have considered submitting to
at the time they signed the BIT. In this “new world of arbitration,” often called “arbitration without privity,”49 what was once
“gentlemanly” becomes autocratic, with a tiny elite privately
working out deals that can deeply affect the well-being of millions of people and the autonomy of entire nations.
While investor-state tribunals have on rare occasions awarded
injunctive relief, they are usually limited to orders necessary
to prevent the secreting away or spoiling of assets. Chevron
observes no such limitation in its desire that Ecuador’s executive
branch declare it absolved of all claims in the Aguinda court
case. Historically, unbounded orders of this sort only flowed
from the “equity” powers of courts of chancery, which were
known to provide remedies as necessary to “do justice” in the
eyes of the sitting magistrate. Though formal chancery is extinct,
domestic courts that assert such jurisdiction do so only under
specific constitutional and statutory grounds, which carefully
circumscribe the degree to which those powers can be exercised.

While Chevron’s BIT case is only designed to evade liability
in Ecuador, the move risks pushing international arbitration in
a radically expansive direction that could provide an unprecedented level of immunity to multinationals. A successful
human rights or commercial claim against a foreign entity could
be snatched away by a private court of arbitrators in which the
party initially bringing suit cannot be heard and has little or no
recourse. Chevron’s core claim that Ecuador’s entire judicial system is broken and therefore denies it due process is a traditional
human rights claim, yet Chevron is using it to derail a human
rights litigation involving the deliberate dumping of billions
of gallons of toxic waste into a local water supply. Chevron is
asserting that, because of the BIT, its rights as an investor trump
those of domestic constituencies, here indigenous groups fighting to remedy the despoliation of the ecosystem on which they
are dependent for their survival.

Another worrying feature of the arbitral panels is that they
have become a major revenue generator, creating perverse incentives. The estimated two dozen private citizen-arbitrators and the
numerous lawyers who repeatedly take part in these proceedings consider themselves members of an informal elite circle,
or to use their words, “The Club.” 50 A typical arbitrator may
never have visited the country over which he or she will serve
as de facto judge and jury and likely will have little appreciation for the policy complexities at stake when the people who
are often most impacted are not represented before the panel.51
The arbitrators also have a pronounced personal incentive to
extend their jurisdiction as widely as reasonably possible given
that they are paid by the hour and can reap millions of dollars
in fees from a single matter. 52 Structurally, the panels seem to
favor well-resourced private investors who can afford the best
legal talent and disfavor the government lawyers running litigation for developing nations. Under the inchoate standards that
govern these proceedings, some arbitrators have ruled in favor
of investors repeatedly across numerous cases. Since there is no
database of decisions and little or no public scrutiny, there is no
system-wide check on any perceived or actual bias. Once a panelist develops a pro-investor reputation grounded in a solid grasp
of international law, he or she becomes part of a highly coveted
pool of candidates who are repeatedly appointed. It is virtually
impossible, given the arbitral rules that govern appointments,
to have a panel where the majority of arbitrators are outside of
“The Club.”53 Chevron’s appointed arbitrator in its hoped-for
BIT case is an example of this phenomenon.54

Whether Chevron’s plan turns out to be “state of the art” is
dependent on how the landscape of arbitration under investment
treaties unfolds and whether, as a general matter, domestic courts
will treat private arbitral awards as barriers to enforcement of
foreign judgments. Unless this gathering danger is addressed,
the prospects for future human rights litigation against corporations like Chevron will face steep new obstacles. Corporate
defendants facing liability in a domestic human rights proceeding could seek safe haven in a BIT by offering conspiracy theories that describe a “denial of justice” or a similarly generalized
claim, allowing an arbitration tribunal to take control and issue
injunctive orders against the domestic sovereign and its courts.

The Gathering Danger of Expansive Jurisdiction of
International Arbitral Tribunals
The modern system of investor-state arbitration evolved
largely out of a much older system of commercial arbitration
between private companies. Such arbitration, based on contracts between specific parties, was heard by panels consisting
of lawyers in private practice and non-lawyer professionals in
the relevant field. It was a “gentlemanly” system of dispute
resolution: tribunals, as a practical matter, looked to more or
less any law they wished;46 established facts “by all appropriate
means;”47 and otherwise acted freely to deliver “arbitral justice”
as between the parties.48 The modern investor-state system,
however, lacks the specific consent and clear limitations that
made the earlier system palatable: BITs are not specific agreements to arbitrate, but generalized offers to arbitrate certain
classes of disputes against certain investors in a wide range

While the scope of Chevron’s requested relief is likely
unprecedented, its actual claims appear tenuous at best. Indeed,
a different tribunal recently rejected a much less sweeping
request for injunctive relief against Ecuador made by Occidental
Petroleum. Notably, the tribunal found that injunctive relief could
be justified only where it was “necessary and urgent” to avoid
harm that was both “imminent and irreparable.”55 Chevron will
have several layers of appeal in Ecuador — which it has vowed
to exhaust56 — where it will still be able to fight enforcement
and raise the same claims that it is asserting before the BIT tribunal.57 So while having to face judgment in such a high-profile
12
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case and answer to an evidentiary record of over 200,000 pages
may be disconcerting to Chevron, relief is hardly “necessary and
urgent” as a matter of international law. Nor is there any threat
of irreparable harm here; a harm is only irreparable if it cannot
be fully compensated by damages, and damages are all that is at
issue. Finally, it is unclear whether Chevron was an “investor”
in Ecuador before the BIT came into force in 1997, since Texaco
left Ecuador in 1992, a fact which could nullify Chevron’s ability
to be covered by the treaty and thus block the arbitration.58

denied by the court. Chevron uses these denials as “evidence”
of the court’s bias.64 In another example, Chevron cites a 2007
decision granting the motion of the plaintiffs to withdraw a
request for judicial inspections of some contaminated well
sites. The parties inspected 47 sites, including all of the 36
sites Chevron requested; each site revealed significant toxic
contamination in soils and water in and around the waste pits.
Additional inspections would have been redundant and consumed years of time. Given that the plaintiffs had concluded
that their burden of proof was met, the court granted the
motion. Chevron has used this issue as a central feature of its
BIT arbitration claim.

The tenuousness of Chevron’s claims, however, should not
be confused with the viability of its overall strategy. Its purpose
is to use — or abuse, as the case may be — the opportunity
afforded by the BIT arbitration to continue to exhaust the
resources of its adversaries and cast a cloud of confusion over
the proceeding in Ecuador. Even if Chevron loses the BIT case,
it is still acting on its threat to pursue a “lifetime of litigation”
that gains the company years of time and additional profits from
the monies it could collect on capital that otherwise would be
used to satisfy a judgment. The arbitration could easily take
five or more years and consume tens of millions of dollars of
attorney time for each side, potentially deterring human rights
litigants from bringing similar cases in countries where Chevron
has operations implicated in human rights abuses.59 Effectively
playing international human rights law and international investment law against one another, the implications of this strategy
raise profound challenges for both areas of law.60

Chevron also claims “political interference” in the trial by
the Ecuadorian executive branch on behalf of the plaintiffs,
a claim for which Chevron has not presented a scintilla of
actual evidence.65 The company cites comments made by
Ecuador’s President Rafael Correa criticizing environmental
damage caused when Texaco was the operator of the oil fields.
However, Chevron fails to mention that, in the same comments, which followed a visit to the region, President Correa
blasted his own state-owned oil company for causing environmental damage, which arguably helps Chevron’s defense that
it is not responsible. Heads of state have a right, indeed an
obligation, to comment on a humanitarian disaster afflicting
their own citizens even if there is open litigation related to it,
and many do. Indeed, U.S. Presidents Barack Obama, George
W. Bush, and Bill Clinton all have commented on ongoing
litigation as a matter of course, without charges that they are
interfering with the independence of the judicial branch.66

From Sour Grapes to “Denial of Justice”
Chevron claims that the Ecuador trial has been conducted
“in total disregard of Ecuadorian law, international standards of
fairness, and Chevron’s basic due process and natural rights.”61
The evidence suggests that Chevron is attempting to contrive a
narrative to undermine the due process rights of the claimants
in Ecuador to create “evidence” that it can use in a BIT arbitration or in a later enforcement action. To this end, the company
has used its lobbyists to convince the U.S. State Department and
the office of the U.S. Trade Representative to adopt reporting
language which seems hand-casted by Chevron’s legal team that
raises doubts about the fairness of Ecuador’s judicial system.62

Conclusion
Cross-border capital flows can bring important economic
benefits and jobs to both developed and developing countries;
in this context, BITs can play a constructive role if designed
to protect the interests of the public and third parties who
may be adversely impacted. The question is how to prevent
the BIT regime from being used to further abusive litigation
tactics that are predicated on a strategy of forum shopping
and indefinite delay. Currently BITs do little to guarantee
procedural or substantive fairness to non-investor litigants.
What has emerged from thousands of separate BITs is a
patchwork system with seemingly inscrutable arbitration provisions. Arbitral tribunals operate unchecked with no formal
public scrutiny, inviting gamesmanship and abuse. Chevron’s
willingness to play musical jurisdictions, all the while consuming the resources of its impoverished adversaries while
amassing record-breaking profits (fractions of which could
pay for a clean-up in Ecuador), threatens to turn the Aguinda
trial into an epic illustration of corporate impunity. Recent
history shows that citizen-arbitrators have generally been only
too willing to play along, pushing the system far past where
states — not to mention third parties whose legal claims are
being hijacked into forums where they cannot appear — ever
thought they would or could venture. Moreover, as the linkages between investment, development, and human rights
increasingly emerge, deeper structural problems that cannot
be papered over are revealed in the BIT arbitral process.

Chevron’s claim is built largely on a disconnected series of
innocuous events along with various incidents fashioned by the
company’s legal team to try to paint a picture of systemic bias.
The Chevron methodology that allows the company to argue that
Ecuador’s judicial system is “broken” could make the judiciaries
of the world’s most robust democracies appear politicized and
corrupt. Using Chevron’s strategy, one would be able to condemn the entire U.S. judiciary by pointing to the fact that U.S.
judges receive campaign contributions in Texas, a federal judge
was recently impeached, two judges in Pennsylvania received
kickbacks by sentencing juveniles to incarceration, seventeen
judges in Illinois were indicted, and the U.S. Supreme Court
arbitrarily decided who would be president in Bush v. Gore.63 In
Ecuador, Chevron has deliberately inundated the trial court with
repetitive motions that it expects to lose in order to support its
central theme. The court decisions cited by Chevron to “prove”
bias in Ecuador all fit well within Ecuadorian and U.S. jurisprudence. For example, Chevron as of the time of this writing had
filed 29 motions to disqualify the Special Master; each one was
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of the plaintiffs, jurisdiction in another court from using the
BIT to re-litigate the same or similar issues and claims in the
arbitral process. Second, BIT arbitral panels might benefit from
bifurcation of jurisdictional and merits-based questions. On this
point, arbitrators hearing jurisdictional questions must not also
hear merits questions, and vice-versa, so there is no incentive
to expand jurisdiction in ways that benefit all. Further, all questions of jurisdiction should be decided as a threshold matter to
avoid extended proceedings on the merits that turn out to be
unnecessary. Finally, just as any public judiciary is held accountable, it might be useful to consider how BIT arbitrators can be
monitored to ensure they have the necessary qualifications to
ensure competent decision making, transparency, and sensitivity
to affected third party concerns. The pool of candidates should
be expanded beyond the members of “The Club,” so the same
arbitrators are not recycled from case to case. In the meantime,
arbitration rules need to be modified to make the hearings
public upon the request of any interested party; to permit third
parties to appear with full rights as parties, including the right
to appoint an arbitrator, if they can prove a sufficiently strong
non-protected interest; and to properly incentivize payments to
arbitrators so they are not motivated for the wrong reasons to
expand their jurisdiction to the edge of what is permissible.

Chevron Vice President Ricardo Reis Veiga talks to the press in the
Superior Court of Justice in Lago Agrio, Ecuador on the first day of
the trial against Chevron on October 21, 2003.

A decentralized system that includes more than 2,500 bilateral treaties may seem dauntingly hard to reform, but current
widespread discontent has already stimulated a fair amount
of thought. Ecuador and Bolivia have withdrawn from the
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes,
the World Bank’s international arbitration arm, and have begun
formulating an alternative dispute resolution mechanism that
would address the broader public interest and function more
predictably and transparently.67 The U.S. State Department has
begun reviewing and amending the U.S. Model BIT, which
often serves as the first draft for BITs between non-U.S. parties.
Changes being considered could add transparency and mechanisms to prevent meritless claims, enhance requirements relating to exhaustion of domestic remedies, increase protections for
affected third parties, and perhaps move entirely from an investor-state to a state-to-state model.68 Likewise, the International
Institute for Sustainable Development has formulated an entire
proposed BIT that would address many of these shortcomings.69
Indeed, even an “international investment court” of the sort proposed by leading academics would go a long way toward clarifying the proper jurisdiction of investment disputes, the latitude
of states to act in the public interest, and the rights available to
affected third parties.70

Whatever the reforms that are needed, this important area
deserves more scrutiny so that the rule of law can better protect
human rights litigants and better control investors who seek to
use abusive litigation tactics. In Aguinda, the Amazon communities will continue fighting for their rights, in whatever
forum they must. The plaintiffs have filed a motion in the same
U.S. federal court where they initially filed Aguinda to enjoin
Chevron from participating in its BIT arbitration on the grounds
it violates the binding promises the company made to the U.S.
court to induce dismissal to Ecuador. Even if the BIT arbitration
is not enjoined and Chevron is granted its ambitious request for
injunctive relief, the communities will argue that the Ecuadorian
court can and should disregard the tribunal’s order and reject
the government’s interference. There is no basis to conclude that
an arbitral order in favor of Chevron would have a preclusive
effect on the enforcement of any adverse judgment in another
country. The plaintiffs plan to move to satisfy any judgment
against Chevron in any of dozens of countries where the company maintains substantial assets. The stakes are enormously
high. For Chevron, the “drown the beast in the bathtub” strategy
of constant litigation and forum-shopping risks destroying its
international reputation and ultimately devastating the company’s financial picture. For the indigenous groups and rainforest
communities, it means more years of litigation but also a growing sense of empowerment to achieve what has always been a
relatively simple objective — clean-up of their ancestral lands
and rainforest ecosystem — that seems to be evolving into a
legal battle with historic ramifications on the global stage. The
international legal community needs to fully appreciate these
stakes to move toward a sustainable future in which the rights
of investors and those of human rights victims are more justly
HRB
balanced. 		

What is clear is that none of these proposed reforms goes far
enough to guarantee fairness to persons in the position of the
Aguinda plaintiffs. The unusual circumstances and long history
of the Aguinda matter require the intervention of a U.S. federal
court to enjoin Chevron from violating its previous representations that served as the basis for the court to send the case to
Ecuador’s courts. Accordingly, both the Aguinda plaintiffs and
Ecuador are seeking such relief now in the very court where the
case started seventeen years ago.71 In terms of the BIT process,
the fact Chevron is pushing the envelope so aggressively reveals
flaws in the arbitration regime that should be corrected. As a
start, those reforming the BITs might consider a bright-line rule
that prohibits an investor who has sought, over the objections
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